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SANDOZ INC. V. AMGEN INC.: 
REMOVING BARRIERS TO MARKET 
ACCESS FOR BIOSIMILAR 
MANUFACTURERS 
MOYOSORE O. KOYA* 
In 2017, the United States Supreme Court considered a case of first 
impression, Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc.,1 a case centered on the patent dispute 
between a biologics manufacturer and a biosimilar manufacturer. The named 
corporations, Amgen Inc. and Sandoz Inc., produce biopharmaceuticals and 
drugs that are similar to those original biopharmaceuticals, respectively.2 The 
Court addressed two issues raised by the governing biological patent statute, the 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA): (1) what remedy is 
available when a biosimilar applicant fails to engage in the disclosure and 
negotiation procedures and (2) whether the 180-day notice of commercial 
marketing is mandatory under the statute.3  
The Supreme Court held that, under the BPCIA provisions outlining the 
disclosure and negotiation procedures between biologic and biosimilar 
manufacturers, a declaratory-judgment action is the only federal remedy 
available for a biosimilar manufacturer’s failure to provide the relevant 
information.4 The Supreme Court further held that a biosimilar applicant can 
provide notice of commercial marketing before FDA approval.5 For the latter 
part of its holding, the Court applied a plain meaning construction to correctly 
read the statute as allowing biosimilar applicants to provide premarketing notice 
before licensure. This Note will focus primarily on the second prong of the 
Supreme Court’s holding. Specifically, this Note will explore the factual and 
statutory background preceding Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. to both explain the 
two prongs of the Supreme Court’s decision and then argue that the second half 
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 1. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017). 
 2. H. Mellstedt et. al., The challenge of biosimilars, 19 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY 411 (2008).  
 3. Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. at 1669. 
 4. See infra notes 113–119 and accompanying text. 
 5. Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. 1664. 
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of the Court’s holding facilitates the goal of the BPCIA of providing an efficient 
pathway to promote drug innovation accessibility of biosimilars to patients. 
I. THE CASE 
Amgen, Inc. and Amgen Manufacturing, Ltd., collectively referred to as the 
plaintiffs “Amgen” in Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., began marketing the biosimilar 
Filgrastim, a drug used by chemotherapy patients to stimulate blood cell 
production,6 under the brand name Neupogen in 1991.7 In July 2014, the 
defendants Sandoz, Inc., Sandoz International GMBH, and Sandoz GMBH, 
collectively named “Sandoz,” applied to the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) 
for approval of a biosimilar product based on Amgen’s Neupogen.8 Afterwards, 
Amgen filed suit against the defendants, in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California based on two grounds.9 Amgen alleged first 
that Sandoz failed to follow the disclosure and negotiation procedures of the 
BPCIA10 and second, that Sandoz acted unlawfully by planning to market its 
biosimilar immediately upon FDA approval of its biosimilar instead of waiting 
180 days after approval.11 Ultimately, Amgen argued that it was entitled to 
injunctive relief under California’s unfair competition law.12 
The district court was tasked with deciding whether Sandoz violated the 
BPCIA when it failed to follow the negotiation and disclosure procedures.13 To 
resolve this issue, the court compared the statutory interpretation of the BPCIA 
by both Amgen and Sandoz.14 Amgen argued that Sandoz violated the BPCIA 
when the company first, failed to provide Amgen with a copy of its Biologic 
License Application (BLA) within twenty days after the FDA received the 
application for review and, second, by choosing not to participate in a disclosure 
and negotiation process.15 Amgen asserted that the BPCIA requires BLA 
 
 6. Filgrastim, Filgrastim-sndz, Tbo-filgrastim Injection, MEDLINEPLUS (Nov. 15, 2017) 
https://medlineplus.gov/druginfo/meds/a692033.html. 
 7. See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (Amgen I), No. 14-cv-04741-RS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34537, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015). 
 8. Id. at *3.  
 9. Id. at *10–11. 
 10. Id. at *14.  
 11. Id. Based on these alleged violations, Amgen stated that it could assert conversion and patent 
infringement claims under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). In response, Sandoz filed 
counterclaims, contesting the UCL and conversion claims by stating that its conduct of not participating 
in disclosure and negotiation procedures was permissible and not constituting patent infringement. Id. at 
*3–4.  
 12. Amgen I, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34537, at *1. 
 13. Id. at *16. 
 14. Id. at *16–21. 
 15. Id. at *14. 
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applicants to comply with the prescribed disclosure and negotiation procedures.16 
The district court agreed with Amgen that the repeated use of the word “shall” 
in these subsections of the BPCIA supported its argument.17 However, the court 
also determined that “shall” in this context does not imply that an action is 
mandatory in every context.18 In this case, it would be permissible to interpret 
the BPCIA to mean that the disclosure and negotiation steps are required only 
when both parties elect to participate in the procedures.19 
The district court further determined that the disclosure and negotiation 
procedures at issue were optional because of subsections § 262(l)(9)(B) and (C) 
created by the BPCIA, which outline another available mechanism when the 
biosimilar applicant fails to participate in the disclosure and negotiation 
process.20 In such instances, the manufacturer of the original biologic product, 
also known as the reference product sponsor, is allowed to begin patent litigation 
immediately.21 The court found this statutory option for reference product 
sponsors to be consistent with the congressional intent of the BPCIA, which is 
to expedite patent litigation.22 Specifically, if the procedures are optional, the 
biosimilar applicant would be justified in bypassing potentially lengthy 
disclosure and negotiation procedures in favor of immediate resolution through 
litigation.23 Based on this interpretation, the court held that it was not only 
permissible for Sandoz to avoid the disclosure and negotiation procedures, but 
also a more accurate interpretation of the statute.24 
The second issue the district court examined was whether Sandoz acted 
unlawfully by informing Amgen of its plans to commercially market its 
biosimilar product before receiving FDA approval.25 The court again concluded 
that Amgen’s statutory interpretation of the negotiation and disclosure provisions 
of the BPCIA was not persuasive.26 The quoted language from the statute is that 
the applicant “shall provide notice to the reference product sponsor not later than 
180 days before the date of the first commercial marketing of the biological 
product licensed under subsection (k).”27 According to the court, Amgen 
determined that “FDA approval must be a condition precedent to valid notice” 
 
 16. Id. at *16.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at *17.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id. at *18. 
 22. Id. at *20.  
 23. Id. at *20.  
 24. Id. at 21. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A) (2018). 
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because of the choice to use “licensed” in the past tense.28 Amgen construed this 
wording to mean that the applicant can only give the required 180-day notice 
after the FDA approves the BLA.29 The court disagreed with Amgen and 
concluded that the focus of the statute is to ensure that the applicant provide 
notice before “first commercial marketing” because FDA approval is required 
before entrance into the market.30 The court found that the word “before” in the 
context of the statute did not refer to the timeline of licensure, but to commercial 
marketing; therefore Sandoz did not act unlawfully by providing notice before 
FDA approval.31 Amgen filed a timely appeal on the final judgment.32  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit also examined 
Amgen’s statutory interpretation. This court affirmed the district court’s ruling 
on the disclosure and negotiation issue based on the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 
262(l)(9)(C) and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) collectively provide an option for the 
reference product sponsor when the applicant fails to disclose.33 The court found 
that Sandoz initiated this pathway by not participating in the disclosure and 
negotiation procedures.34 Therefore, Amgen was not entitled to an injunction 
based on California law, which states that where the underlying statute expressly 
provides a remedy, any other remedy is not available.35  
However, the court of appeals found Amgen’s interpretation of the 
contested disclosure and negotiation provisions created by the BPCIA persuasive 
and ultimately held that these sections require a biosimilar product to be licensed 
prior to notice of commercial marketing.36 The court reasoned that Congress 
intended for the FDA to approve the product before the biosimilar applicant can 
give notice of commercial marketing to the reference product sponsor.37 
Specifically, the court stated that if Congress meant to allow notice before 
licensure, the statute would have referred to “‘the biological product that is the 
subject of’ the application” instead of “the biological product licensed” as the 
statute describes.38 The court interpreted the notice provision of the BPCIA, § 
262(l)(8)(A), as mandatory under all circumstances, unlike other provisions that 
are triggered by an applicant’s opting into the negotiation and disclosure 
 
 28. Amgen I, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34537, at *22. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at *24–25.  
 32. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. (Amgen II) 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Amgen also filed an appeal 
based on the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. Id.  
 33. Id. at 1357.  
 34. Id. at 1357.  
 35. Id. at 1356, 1360. 
 36. Id. at 1358.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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procedures.39 Thus, the court ruled that Sandoz was prohibited from marketing 
its biosimilar until the 180-day timeframe following FDA approval of the 
product had lapsed.40 
In summation, the court of appeals decided the case in favor of Sandoz on 
whether the procedures were mandatory and in Amgen’s favor on whether it was 
unlawful for a biosimilar applicant to give notice of first commercial marketing 
before FDA approval. As a result, both Amgen and Sandoz appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in a consolidated case.41 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The statutory background surrounding Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. can be 
confusing so it is necessary to explore the legislative background of the BPCIA 
to provide context for the provisions at issue in the litigation. Section II.A 
examines the development and purpose of the BPCIA. Section II.B focuses on 
the regulatory procedures governing the patent relationship between biologic and 
biosimilar manufacturers as outlined in the BPCIA as well as the relevant 
provisions contributing to the tension between Sandoz and Amgen. Finally, 
Section II.C. focuses on the two issues Amgen raised in the original litigation 
that were subsequently presented to the Supreme Court. 
A. The BPCIA: A Legislative Overview 
The pharmaceutical industry is very lucrative in the United States. 
Contributing to this are the high prices of drugs known as biologics, which are 
drug products derived from living organisms.42 The Biologics Price Competition 
and Innovation Act (BPCIA) of 2010 was included in President Obama’s 
comprehensive Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.43 The two primary 
goals of the BPCIA are: (1) promoting the innovation of biologic therapies by 
providing incentives and (2) promoting the accessibility of biologic therapies by 
keeping prices affordable.44 The legislation was drafted as an amendment to the 
 
 39. Id. at 1360. 
 40. Id. Sandoz’s biosimilar Zarxio was approved by the FDA on March 6, 2015, meaning that in 
order to comply with the ruling of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the company could not 
place its drug on the market until September 2, 2015. Id. 
 41. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017). 
 42. Geoffrey M Levit, The Drugs/Biologics Approval Process, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE 
FDA’S FOOD AND DRUG LAW REGULATION 125, 167 (Kenneth R. Piña & Wayne L. Pines eds., 6th ed. 
2017). 
 43. Implementation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/ucm215089.htm (last updated 
Feb. 12, 2016); see also supra note 27, at 168. 
 44. Ude Lu, Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Striking a Delicate Balance Between 
Innovation and Accessibility, 15 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 613, 613 (2014). 
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Public Health Service Act (PHSA) to create an expedited approval pathway for 
biosimilar products, also sometimes referred to as “follow-on biologics (FOBs)”, 
which are characterized as “highly similar” to biological product that is FDA 
approved.45 Specifically, the BPCIA amended § 351 of the PHSA by adding 
subsections (k)46 and (l).47  
The new § 351(k) of the PHSA describes the process of licensing a 
biosimilar product.48 Four years after a biologic reference product is licensed, 
anyone can submit a biosimilar application for approval based on the licensed 
biologic product. This application must include information in five categories, 
the first of which, in relevant part, requires demonstrating that “the biological 
product that is the subject of the application is ‘biosimilar’ to a reference 
product.”49 The FDA is required to license a biosimilar if the information in the 
application is “sufficient to show that the biological product is biosimilar to the 
reference product.”50 
Additionally, § 351(k) explains the exclusivity periods that exist for both 
the biosimilar drug and the reference product.51 The first drug that is classified 
by the FDA as a biosimilar of the reference product earns two types of 
exclusivity. First, the biosimilar is the only product that can be classified as 
interchangeable with the reference product, and second, that biosimilar is granted 
at least one year of market exclusivity after the biosimilar first commercially 
markets its product.52 The reference product sponsor, on the other hand, enjoys 
a long period of market exclusivity that lasts for twelve years from the date it 
was first licensed by the FDA regardless of whether or not its original patent has 
expired.53 
The long patent life for biologic products spurred the need for legislation 
like the BPCIA, particularly during the early 2000s when biologics began to 
 
 45. Lu, supra note 44, at 613–14. 
 46. Id.  
 47. See infra notes 64–73 and accompanying text.  
 48. Levit, supra note 42, at 168. 
 49. Levit, supra note 42, at 169. The remaining requirements for the information to be provided in a 
subsection (k) application are: “2) the biosimilar product and reference product use the same mechanism(s) 
of action for the condition(s) of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling, to 
the extent the mechanism(s) of action are known for the reference product; 3) the condition(s) of use 
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling proposed for the biosimilar product have been 
previously approved for the reference product; 4) the biosimilar product has the same out of 
administration, dosage form, and strength as the reference product; and 5) the facility in which the 
biosimilar product is manufactured, processed, packed, or held meets standards designed to assure that the 
product continues to be safe, pure, and potent.” Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 42 U.S.C.§ 262(k)(7)(B) (2018). 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6). Under this provision, other periods of the patent activity, including the 
litigation, can determine when a biosimilar’s period of market exclusivity begins. Id.  
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7). 
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comprise to a significant portion of the pharmaceutical industry.54 As a result, 
the industry recognized that the development of an abbreviated pathway for the 
approval of biosimilars would result in high savings,55 similar to what the Hatch-
Waxman bill accomplished for small molecule drugs.56 The fact that big 
pharmaceutical companies faced little to no market competition as their biologics 
patents began to expire revealed the need for an abbreviated biosimilar approval 
pathway.57  
In response, the BPCIA created the Abbreviated Biologic License 
Application (aBLA) pathway for biosimilar drugs.58 The aBLA pathway 
increases the accessibility of biologic therapies, which are typically expensive, 
by encouraging market competition as a means of developing cheaper drug 
therapies for consumers.59 Once the FDA licenses the biosimilar, the product can 
begin competing with the reference product.60 The BPCIA simultaneously 
encourages innovation by biologics companies by offering the incentive of a 
twelve-year period of market exclusivity for those biologics.61 This is a win for 
biologics companies because the market exclusivity period can potentially last 
longer than that of an active patent.62  
Although the BPCIA has resulted in positive outcomes for pharmaceutical 
companies, there is still tension between biologics and biosimilar manufacturers 
that fundamentally stems from market control. The two statutory provisions of 
the BPCIA that are responsible for the most litigation are: (1) the necessity of the 
information exchange procedure known as the “patent dance” and (2) the 
 
 54. Lu, supra note 44, at 618. 
 55. Biogenerics: Not Yet a Reality in the U.S., TRADER THOUGHTS 1 (Dec. 24, 2011), 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/58230-biogenerics-not-yet-a-reality-in-the-u-s. 
 56. Similar to the BPCIA, the Hatch-Waxman Act focuses on promoting innovation and accessibility 
by providing a patent term extension (PTE) incentive for innovators and establishing the abbreviated new 
drug application (ANDA) to help generic drugs enter the market. Lu, supra note 44, at 615.  
 57. Id. at 619–20. 
 58. Id. at 614. 
 59. Id. 633–34. 
 60. Gregory S. Asciolla & Matthew J. Perez, “Shall We Dance?” – Biologic-Biosimilar Competition 
Under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 1, 2 (2015). 
 61. Lu, supra note 44, at 623–24 (describing this exclusivity period as one of the major tools outlined 
in the BPCIA to encourage innovation). See also 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2018).  
 62. Lu, supra note 44, at 623–24. Other benefits to this exclusivity period: it covers more than one 
patent because FDA approval on each biological entity coverage on average 2.7 patents; FDA exclusivity 
is independent from patent exclusivity even if the patent for a biologic expires, the FDA exclusivity is still 
applicable; FDA exclusivity eliminates design around issues because it applies to the final product so a 
generic company can’t get FDA approval on that basis that it manufactured the final product differently. 
Id. at 623–24. See also Felix Shin, Leaping from the Patent Cliff into the Global Drug Gap: Overcoming 
Exclusivity to Provide Affordable Biosimilars, 37 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 419, 429 (2016) 
(stating that the 12 year exclusivity period runs parallel to any patents already held by the reference 
product sponsor which offers greater security for the reference product sponsor in the drug market). 
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necessity of getting FDA approval prior to issuing the 180-notice of commercial 
marketing.63 
B. The New § 262(l) and The “Patent Dance”  
The BPCIA created a series of private information exchanges between the 
biosimilar applicant and the reference product sponsor known as the “patent 
dance” in an effort to try and avoid patent litigation.64 This information exchange 
is divided into five steps called the “patent dance” which are further split into 
two stages of litigation. 65 The first stage of litigation begins after the FDA 
informs a biosimilar applicant that its subsection (k) application has been 
accepted for review.66 Within twenty days of that notice, the biosimilar applicant 
must submit to the reference product sponsor a copy of its application and any 
information concerning the processes used to manufacture the biosimilar.67 The 
next step requires the reference product sponsor to provide a list of patents that 
cover the biologic product to the subsection (k) applicant within sixty days of the 
application being submitted.68 This list also includes “patents that the reference 
product sponsor would be prepared to license to the applicant.”69 These steps 
outlined in the statute also suggests that the subsection (k) applicant can within 
sixty days provide a list of patents to which the applicant reasonably believes the 
reference product sponsor could assert a claim of patent infringement.70 
Next, the applicant and the reference product sponsor participate in “good 
faith negotiations” to determine which of the patents listed by the applicant from 
the preceding step “shall be the subject of an action for patent infringement.”71 
If the parties agree on which patents may be subject to patent infringement 
actions, the reference product sponsor must bring the infringement action within 
30 days.72 A biosimilar applicant’s failure to adhere to these procedures entitles 
the reference product sponsor to a declaratory patent infringement action.73 This 
marks the end of the fist phase of the litigation process.  
During the second phase of litigation, the biosimilar applicant needs to 
provide notice to the reference product sponsor at least 180 days before it begins 
 
 63. Gregory S. Asciolla & Matthew J. Perez, “Shall We Dance?” – Biologic-Biosimilar Competition 
Under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 3 (2015). 
 64. Levit, supra note 42, at 171. 
 65. 42 U.S.C § 262(l)(2)–(6) (2018). 
 66. Levit, supra note 42, at 171. 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2). 
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 69. Id. 
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(B)(i). 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(4).  
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(6). 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(B).  
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commercially marketing its biosimilar product.74 Once the reference product 
sponsor receives notice, they can move for a preliminary injunction on any 
patents previously identified in the lists of patents held by the reference product 
sponsor that did not move past the first stage of the patent litigation.75 
It can be challenging to keep track of the different patent negotiation and 
litigation steps and one question the “patent dance” raises is whether or not the 
information exchange between the applicant and reference product sponsor is 
mandatory or optional.76 Proponents of a mandatory patent dance argue that the 
framework provides certainty and protection for both the reference product 
sponsor and the biosimilar applicant because each party can concurrently prepare 
for litigation under an establishing process following the approval of a biosimilar 
application.77 On the other hand, if the “patent dance” is optional, biosimilar 
applicants gain the advantage of being in a position to dictate the nature of its 
interaction with the reference product sponsor from the point of biosimilar 
application approval.78  
C. Two Issues on Point: Identifying The Appropriate Federal Remedy and The 
Notice of Commercial Marketing timing Requirement  
As the Supreme Court recognized, the patent scheme responsible for the 
litigation between Sandoz and Amgen is a complicated one. First, this section 
will examine the congressional intent behind supplying a federal remedy for a § 
262(l)(2)(A) violation and, second, this section will highlight the treatment of the 
notice requirement under § 262(l)(2)(A). 
1. What is the federal remedy?  
The BPCIA created § 262(l)(2)(A), which states that a subsection (k)79 
applicant “shall provide to the reference product sponsor a copy of the 
application” and “such other information that describes the process or processes 
used to manufacture the biological product that is the subject of such 
application.”80 This language suggests that a biosimilar applicant must provide 
 
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A). 
 75. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(B). 
 76. Dov Hirsch, The Riddle of the Mysterious Patent Dance Wrapped in an Enigma: Is the Patent 
Dance of the BPCIA Optional or Mandatory, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 645, iv 
(2017) (describing that whether the “patent dance” is mandatory or optional has implications for the 
pharmaceutical industry, specifically because a designation of mandatory or optional changes which party, 
the biologic manufacturer or the biosimilar applicant, has a greater advantage and bargaining position 
during the stages of negotiation outlined in the BPCIA). 
 77. Hirsch, supra note 76, at 670. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
 80. 42 U.S.C.§ 262(l)(2)(A). 
  
84 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 22:75 
 
the aforementioned information and it follows that there is a remedy available 
when the biosimilar applicant fails to do so. The BPCIA acknowledges this by 
stating that when a subsection (k) applicant does not provide the information 
listed in § 262(l)(2)(A), the reference product sponsor can bring an action for “a 
declaration of infringement, validity, or enforceability of any patent that claims 
the biological product or a use of the biological product.”81  
Understanding how the BPCIA works to identify violations, like a failure 
to disclose, and the associated remedies, requires careful statutory interpretation. 
One principle of statutory construction is that where a statute identifies a certain 
remedy, courts should uphold enforcement of that remedy and avoid reading 
more remedies under the statute.82 This means that the strongest evidence for the 
remedy Congress intended to provide is within the language of the statute,83 in 
this case, the BPCIA. Another pillar of statutory construction helpful in 
understanding the BPCIA is relying on the legislative history of the 
congressional measure to infer intent.84 In 2007 the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor & Pensions engaged in discussions to make 
amendments to the PHSA.85 The committee drafted the S.1695 bill to include 
provisions for both patent litigation and remedies “available to the innovator 
upon a finding that the patent was valid and infringed.”86  
The proposed amendments also included declaratory judgment provisions 
to § 351(l) of the PHSA. One amended provision indicates that where a 
biosimilar applicant has failed to provide its application and manufacturing 
information, the reference product sponsor could bring a declaratory judgment 
in reference to the “patent that claimed the biological product or a use of the 
biological product.”87 This language survived for the next three years and 
 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C). 
 82. Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (acknowledging that whether or 
not a statute “creates a cause of action either expressly or by implication, [it] is basically a matter of 
statutory construction.”). 
 83. For a discussion on the weight of evidence the statute provides in revealing congressional intent, 
see Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981), stating that “[i]n the 
absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress 
provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate.” 
 84. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13. 
 85. Krista Hessler Carver, et. al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price Competition 
and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 671, 755 (2010). It is important to note that the PHSA 
is an important legislative ancestor of the BPCIA because the Biologics Act of 1902 was incorporated as 
§ 351 of the PHSA, which subsequently became the provision amended by the BPCIA. Id. For a recent 
discussion on the legislative history leading up to the enactment of both the Biologics Act and the PHSA, 
see Terry S. Coleman, Early Developments in the Regulation of Biologics, 71 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 544 
(2016). 
 86. Hessler, supra note 85, at 755. 
 87. Id. (citing S. 1695 2(a)(2), proposed PHSA § 351(l)(9)(C)). 
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through the BPCIA was incorporated as § 262(l)(9)(C).88 Therefore, both the 
language of this provision and its legislative history suggest that Congress 
intended to provide a declaratory judgment action as the remedy for the reference 
product sponsor when the applicant fails to disclose as outlined under § 
262(l)(2)(A).  
2.. The Requirement of Notice of First Commercial Marketing  
The BPCIA established a notice requirement under § 262(l)(8)(A), which 
had the unfortunate effect of fostering tension between biologics and biosimilar 
manufacturers. This subsection of the statute states that the biosimilar applicant 
needs to provide notice to the reference product sponsor of its plans to market a 
biosimilar product “not later than 180 days before the date of first commercial 
marketing.”89 Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc. presented the question of whether a 
biosimilar applicant can only provide premarketing notice after the FDA 
approves its biosimilar product.90 Treatment of § 262(l)(8)(A) indicates that the 
consensus among lower courts is to interpret the provision as requiring FDA 
approval of a biosimilar before the applicant can give notice to the reference 
product sponsor. For example, in Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc.,91 the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit embraced this consensus by holding that the 
subsection (k) applicant must wait for FDA approval before it can give notice of 
commercial marketing.92  
The following year in Janssen Biotech v. Celltrion Healthcare,93 the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts relied on the holding in 
Amgen, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc. to interpret that the negotiation and disclosure section 
of the BPCIA to mean that biosimilar applicants could only give post-approval 
notice of first commercial marketing.94 In its complaint, plaintiff Janssen argued 
that because the defendants (Celltrion and Hospira) provided notice before FDA 
approval of their biosimilar version of Jannsen’s Remicade, the defendants acted 
in contrast to the purpose of the BPCIA’s statutory timeline.95 According to 
Janssen, requiring the applicant to wait for FDA approval allows the parties to 
adjudicate patent disputes and affords the biologics innovator time to seek a 
preliminary injunction to prevent the biosimilar from entering the market.96 The 
 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(C) (2018). 
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (l)(8)(A). 
 90. See supra Part II. 
 91. Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc. (Amgen III), 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 92. Amgen III, 827 F.3d at 1054. 
 93. Janssen Biotech, Inc. v. Celltrion Healthcare Co., 210 F. Supp. 3d 244 (D. Mass. 2016). 
 94. Janssen, 210 F. Supp. at 246–47. 
 95. Complaint of Petitioner at 3, No. 1:15-v-10698-MLW, Janssen Biotech Inc. v. Celltrion 
Healthcare Co., 210 F. Supp. 3d 244 (D. Mass. 2016).  
 96. Id. 
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district court found these arguments persuasive and the opinion further implied 
that FDA licensure was a prerequisite to premarketing notice.97 
Janssen’s arguments acknowledge the policy concerns surrounding the 
BPCIA’s commercial marketing provision. Innovators of biologics, like Janssen, 
prefer to support a requirement for licensure prior to notice because it allows 
them fully exercise their power in the patent litigation and resolution process as 
outlined in the BPCIA. On the other hand, biosimilar applicants prefer a flexible 
interpretation that allows notice prior to licensure. This is because as a strategic 
move, an applicant who gives notice before FDA approval could attempt to 
bypass the second phase of patent litigation by informing the reference product 
sponsor that their product is ready for market.98 
Primarily, the BPCIA provides the framework for reference product 
sponsors like Amgen and biosimilar manufacturers like Sandoz to interact with 
one another. Within this framework, the patent dance and notice of first 
commercial marketing by the biosimilar applicant are just two such interactions 
that can result in litigation between pharmaceutical companies. It then becomes 
the role of a court to determine what remedy, if any, is available, and whether 
certain provisions of the BPCIA, such as the disclosure and notice of commercial 
marketing provisions, are optional or mandatory for the parties in the suit. 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
included two holdings. The Court examined the BPCIA and held first that 
injunctive relief was unavailable as a federal remedy under § 262(l)(2)(A).99 
Second, the Court held that a biosimilar applicant is allowed to give notice of 
first commercial marketing prior to FDA approval under § 262(l)(8)(A) of the 
statute.100 This section will explore how the Supreme Court came to both 
conclusions by (1) examining the Court’s interpretation of the relevant statutory 
provisions and (2) identifying how the Court differentiated from the analysis of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
 
 97. Janssen, 210 F. Supp. at 246. The district judge opined that although the FDA approved defendant 
Cellitron’s biosimilar product in April 2016, the company could not begin selling its product until October 
2016. Id.  
 98. John L Marquardt & Stephen R Auten, Strategic Considerations under the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act, 23 EXPERT OPINION ON THERAPEUTIC PATS. 915, 918 (2013), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1517/13543776.2013.813935.  
 99. Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1674 (2017). 
 100. Id. at 1677. 
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A.. Identifying the Appropriate Remedy for Negotiation and Disclosure 
Violations  
The Supreme Court began its analysis by combing through the relevant 
statutory provisions to determine whether the information exchange between the 
applicant and reference product sponsor described by the BPCIA is enforceable 
by injunction.101 The Court identified 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) and 35 U.S.C. § 
271(e), the statutory scheme for patent infringement, as outlining what remedies 
are available when an applicant does not comply with the disclosure 
requirements.102 
The Court focused closely on two clauses within 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C). 
Clauses (i) and (ii) recognize that an act of artificial infringement can result in 
either of two pathways after the applicant receives notice from the FDA that its 
application is under review.103 Clause (i) states that artificial infringement occurs 
when the biosimilar applicant submits an application regarding the patents 
potentially subject to suit, which were identified by each party in the § 262(l)(3) 
lists created previously.104 In the alternative, clause (ii) states that artificial 
infringement occurs when the applicant submits an application without first 
sharing the application and manufacturing information with the reference 
product sponsor so the parties never reach the stage of assembling § 262(l)(3) 
lists to identify what patents might be subject to suit.105 Therefore, under this 
section, submission of the application represents an act of artificial infringement 
“with respect to any patent that could have been included on the lists.”106  
Based on this, the Court determined that the two provisions of § 
271(e)(2)(C) worked together to identify that the act of infringement for which a 
remedy is available under § 271(e) is the act of submitting the biosimilar 
application.107 The Supreme Court then reasoned that Sandoz’s failure to provide 
its application or manufacturing information is not the sort of action identified as 
an act of artificial infringement within the statute.108 The Court stressed this point 
in an attempt to clarify why the lower court’s reasoning, despite reaching the 
correct conclusion on this issue, was flawed. According to the Supreme Court, 
the lower court focused on the following language in § 271(e)(2)(C)(ii): “if the 
applicant for the application fails to provide the application and information 
 
 101. Id. at 1674. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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required under [262(l)(2)(A)]”109 to determine that Sandoz committed artificial 
infringement.110 By concluding that Sandoz was guilty of artificial infringement, 
the court of appeals concluded that the only remedy available to Amgen was that 
prescribed by § 271(e)(4).111 However, the Supreme Court’s focus on the 
structure of  § 271(e)(2)(C) allowed it to conclude that neither clause describes 
an “applicant’s failure to provide its application and manufacturing information 
an element of the act of artificial infringement” and furthermore that in neither 
clause does “271(e)(4) provide a remedy for that failure.”112  
Next, the Supreme Court moved its discussion to the remedy available 
when an applicant fails to provide its application and manufacturing 
information.113 As enacted by the BPCIA, § 262(l)(9)(C) a sponsor is authorized 
to immediately file an action for a declaratory judgment based on an act of 
artificial infringement as defined by § 271(e)(2)(C)(ii).114 In this case, Sandoz’s 
submission of its application to the FDA without first providing the application 
and manufacturing information to Amgen constituted an act of artificial 
infringement,115 entitling Amgen to a remedy under § 262(l)(9)(C).116 The Court 
determined that § 262(l)(9)(C) was meant to provide the only federal remedy for 
an applicant’s failure to comply with the disclosure requirements under § 
262(l)(2)(A).117 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas, relying on Great-West 
Life & Annuity v. Ins. Co. v. Knudson, argued that the best evidence of what 
remedy Congress intended to provide for such a failure was the language and 
structure of the BPCIA itself.118 Based on the language of this provision, it was 
clear to the Court that “Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that 
it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.”119  
The Supreme Court relied on additional text within the BPCIA to support 
the position that Congress intended to make available to a reference product 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1675.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Neither party was in dispute that Sandoz failed to comply with the disclosure procedures outlined 
in § 262(l)(2)(A). Id. at 1676. 
 116. Id. at 1675. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (citing Great-West Life & Annuity v. Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) 
(demonstrating that where there exists an extensive and comprehensive piece of legislation, in the context 
of what equitable remedies are available under Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 
a state action brought to enforce a reimbursement provision by a health plan to recover from a beneficiary 
any proceeds paid by a third party, the Supreme Court is reluctant to extend the scope of a statute so as to 
infer remedies that are not already outlined in the statute itself)). 
 119. Id. at 1675 (quoting Great-West Life & Annuity v. Ins. Co. v. Knudson 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002)). 
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sponsor only a declarative judgment action only when a biosimilar applicant fails 
to disclose its application and manufacturing information. For example, § 
262(l)(1)(H) states that a court can consider injunctive relief as an available 
remedy for a violation, or threatened violation, of the rules of confidentiality as 
they relate to any information disclosed under § 262(l).120 According to the 
Court, because Congress explicitly attached injunctive relief as a remedy for a 
confidentiality violation, an applicant’s failure to disclose is not a violation that 
Congress intended to attach injunctive relief as the remedy.121 Therefore, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s holding that enforcing compliance 
with § 262(l)(2)(A) via an injunction was not the appropriate remedy for Amgen 
under federal law.122 
B. Identifying the Timeline for Notice of First Commercial Marketing Under 
the BPCIA 
The second prong of the Supreme Court’s holding addressed whether or 
not, the BPCIA allows a biosimilar applicant to provide notice of first 
commercial marketing to the reference product sponsor only after FDA 
approval.123 Specifically, the Court examined whether Sandoz complied with the 
law when it informed Amgen of plans to start marketing its biosimilar 
immediately after receiving FDA approval of its drug.124  
The BPCIA adopted § 262(l)(8)(A) as the statutory text that refers to the 
timeline concerning when a biosimilar applicant is to provide notice of first 
commercial marketing. The Court again focused on the structure of the provision 
itself to interpret its meaning125 The Supreme Court concentrated on the exact 
language of the statute, which states that the applicant “shall provide notice to 
the reference product sponsor not later than 180 days before the date of first 
commercial marketing of the biological product licensed under subsection 
(k).”126 The Court interpreted this as requiring the applicant to provide notice at 
least 180 days before the date of first commercial marketing.127  
 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. The Court declined to review the Federal Circuit’s holding that Sandoz’s failure to disclose 
its application and manufacturing information was not “‘unlawful under California’s unfair competition 
law’” both because this did not present a question of federal law and whether the BPCIA’s negotiation 
and disclosure procedures are relevant matters only insofar as to determine whether there was unlawful 
conduct under the state law. Id.  
 123. Id. at 1677. 
 124. Id. at 1672. 
 125. Id. at 1677.  
 126. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A) (2018)).  
 127. Id. 
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Next, the Court evaluated the strength of Amgen’s main argument that the 
statute requires a biosimilar product to be approved by the FDA before the 
applicant can inform the reference product sponsor of first commercial 
marketing.128 Amgen argued that because § 262(l)(8)(A) referred to “the 
biological product licensed” instead of just “‘the biological product that is the 
subject of’ the application” like in other BPCIA provisions, that meant that notice 
of first commercial marketing can only come after FDA approval129 The 
Supreme Court was not persuaded by this argument because the provision that 
Amgen relied on, § 262(l)(3)(B)(ii)(I),130 inherently needs to reference the 
biological product that the subsection (k) application is based on, otherwise 
referring to a licensed product in this provision would not have made sense.131 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that an applicant could provide notice 
of commercial marketing prior to FDA licensure and thus Sandoz was in full 
compliance with § 262(l)(8)(A).132 Ultimately, the Court felt that the lower 
appellate court erred in granting an injunction to prevent Sandoz from marketing 
its filgrastim product until 180 days after licensure.133 The two courts differed on 
this issue because each relied on different interpretations for the number of 
timing requirements for notice of commercial marketing imposed by the BPCIA. 
The Supreme Court interpreted § 262(l)(8)(A) as imposing only the requirement 
that the applicant needed to provide notice at least 180 days prior to marketing, 
but not necessarily prior to licensure.134 The federal circuit, however, interpreted 
this same provision as imposing two timing requirements such that the biosimilar 
applicant would be providing notice of commercial marketing both after the FDA 
approves the product and at least 180 days before the applicant begins marketing 
its biosimilar.135 The Supreme Court reasoned that the lower court incorrectly 
interpreted the statute, and supported its argument with the fact that the adjacent 
provision, § 262(l)(8)(B), expressly outlined two timing requirements.136  
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (referencing Brief for Amgen Inc. et al.). 
 130. This section “requires the applicant to explain why the sponsor’s patents are ‘invalid, 
unenforceable, or will not be infringed by the commercial marketing of the biological product that is the 
subject of the subsection (k) application.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (2018)). 
 131. Id. Section 262(l)(3)(B)(ii)(I) references the product that is the subject of the (k) application 
because the applicant would be unable to make the evaluation identified in the section after licensure 
“because the biosimilar’s specifications may change during the application process.” The Supreme Court 
also found Amgen’s policy arguments unpersuasive. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1678. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1677. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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The Supreme Court relied on Russello v. United States137 to strengthen its 
assertion that if Congress meant to impose two timing requirements in § 
262(l)(8)(A), “it presumably would have done so expressly as it did in the 
immediately following subparagraph.”138 For these reasons, the Supreme Court 
reversed the federal circuit’s holding that a biosimilar applicant can only provide 
notice to the reference product sponsor of commercial marketing following FDA 
approval. Instead, the Supreme Court held that a biosimilar applicant is permitted 
to provide notice of first commercial marketing before FDA approval of the 
biosimilar drug product.139 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., the Supreme Court’s holding is two-fold. This 
Analysis focuses on the second part of the Court’s opinion, which articulated the 
correct holding that a biosimilar applicant could provide premarketing notice 
prior to FDA licensure.140 The holding is significant for the following reasons: 
(1) it is consistent with the innovation and drug accessibility goals of the BPCIA; 
and (2) it both creates a new incentive for biosimilar manufacturers and acts as a 
mechanism that ensures the exclusivity period for the original biologic product 
of the reference sponsor is limited to exactly twelve years.  
A. Permitting Pre-approval Notice of Commercial Marketing is Consistent 
With the Goals of the BPCIA 
At its basic level, the BPCIA provides an accelerated approval pathway for 
biosimilars, which incentivizes competition between biologics manufacturers 
and biosimilar manufacturers while reducing overall costs to patients.141 The 
Supreme Court’s unanimous 9–0 decision in Sandoz of allowing biosimilar 
applicants to provide premarketing notice before FDA approval is consistent 
with these goals.  
Additionally, the BPCIA provides a solution to the unique challenge 
biosimilar manufacturers experience when entering the drug market.142 This 
challenge is due in part to the manufacturing process associated with creating 
 
 137. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 1, 16 (1983). 
 138. Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. at 1677 (2017) (quoting Russello, 464 U.S. at 23). 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. at 1678. 
 141. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 142. Erwin A. Blackstone and Joseph P. Fuhr, The Economics of Biosimilars, 6 AM. HEALTH & DRUG 
BENEFITS 469, 471 (2013) (describing that biosimilar market entry is first delayed by the barriers imposed 
in needing to overcome the unique hurdles “associated with manufacturing, marketing, storage (cold) and 
other distribution issues, delivery devices, immunogenicity (i.e., patient adverse reactions because of live 
organisms), and special requirements for pharmacovigilance (ie, postsale monitoring)). 
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biologic drugs, which are known for their structural complexity.143 Biologics are 
developed from living cells144 and because individual cells are often not perfect 
copies of each other, this leads to slight variations in the development of the 
biosimilars based on those biologic products.145 This prevents biosimilars from 
being marketed as perfect or identical substitutes for biologic products, thereby 
requiring creative marketing strategies that demonstrate why biosimilars are still 
beneficial to patients in order to assuage any skepticism from stakeholders.146 
The challenge of creating biosimilars results in fewer biosimilar entrants to 
the drug market,147 making it difficult to boost innovation among biosimilar 
manufacturers. Thus, biologics manufacturers are in a position to significantly 
monopolize the drug market by requiring biosimilar applicants to wait 180 days 
after FDA approval to provide commercial marketing notice.148 For example, 
Amgen produces a substantial fraction of the biologic products for common 
medical conditions and in 2016, benefitted from about $16.7 billion in U.S. 
sales.149 Therefore, it does little to foster innovation when the same companies 
like Amgen, Hoffman-la Roche,150and Johnson & Johnson151 produce a bulk of 
biologic pharmaceuticals for common medical conditions.152  
 
 143. Bhupinder Singh Sekhon & Vikrant Saluja, Biosimilars: An Overview, DOVE PRESS J.: 
BIOSIMILARS 1, 2–3 (2011) (describing that some of the difficulty associated with manufacturing biologic 
products is that they are much bigger molecules than small molecule drugs, adding considerably to the 
molecular weight of biologic products). 
 144. Bruno Calo Fernandez & Juan Leonardo Martinez-Hurtado, Biosimilars: Company Strategies to 
Capture Value from the Biologics Market, 5 PHARMACEUTICALS 1393, 1397 (2012). 
 145. Id. 
 146. John Carlsen, MHA & Kristi Skorija, Biosimilars: The Commercial Challenge, COVANCE BLOG 
(Sept. 2, 2014), http://blog.covance.com/2014/09/biosimilars-commercial-challenge/.  
 147. Henry Grabowski et al, Biosimilar Pathway, 41 SETON L. REV., 511, 538 (2011). 
 148. One way that exclusivity periods for biologics manufacturers exists is in the way that these 
companies are able to sell their products at “monopoly rates,” meaning that biologics innovators become 
more incentivized to maintain these monopolies as long as possible, to the detriment of biosimilar 
manufacturers. Yaniv Heled, Patents v. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals – Do We 
Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOM. TECH. L. REV. 419 (2012).  
 149. Fiona Scott Morton & Lysle T. Boller, Enabling Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets, 
HUTCHINS CTR. 1, 4 (2011) (depicting as Table 1: Top 30 biologics by sales, which breaks down the 
amount in U.S. dollars of sales in 2016 for pharmaceutical companies producing biologics for particular 
medical indications and that Amgen Corporation’s sales in 2016 resulted from products treating 
rheumatoid arthritis, cancer, anemia, renal failure, osteoporosis, bone cancer, and HIV/AIDS.). 
 150. Id. (indicating $14 billion in total sales in 2016 for Hoffmann la-Roche resulting from biologics 
targeting cancer, rheumatoid arthritis, macular degeneration, breast cancer, asthma, anemia and renal 
failure). 
 151. Id. (indicating $8.3 billion in total sales in 2016 for Johnson & Johnson resulting from biologics 
treating rheumatoid arthritis, Crohn’s disease, psoriasis, and ulcerative colitis). 
 152. A related problem acknowledged by commentators in the pharmaceutical industry is the overall 
decline in the past few years within the Big Pharma sector in research and development productivity, 
which at least for brand-name companies resulted in defensive strategies to keep generics from threatening 
the market. Ajay Gautam, The Changing Model of Big Pharma: Impacts of Key Trends, 21 DRUG 
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Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court’s holding in Sandoz facilitates 
the BPCIA’s goal of innovation because a biosimilar applicant’s product need 
not be licensed before the applicant provides notice of commercial marketing, 
resulting in quicker drug dissemination once the biosimilar product is 
approved.153 This incentivizes biosimilar development because an applicant does 
not need to wait until licensure to start developing a successful marketing 
strategy and could conceivably plan to enter the market almost immediately 
following FDA approval.154 The steady influx of new biosimilars approved by 
the FDA will weaken the monopolies held by biologic drug manufacturers,155 
which in turn will foster industry competition. 
Furthermore, the holding in Sandoz, by encouraging competition between 
biologics and biosimilars, does even more to facilitate the second goal of the 
BPCIA of promoting accessibility to patients by reducing drug costs.156 A 2009 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) report estimated that biosimilar products 
would be about ten to thirty percent cheaper than brand-name biologics.157 
Although the report argued that the long-term benefits of an abbreviated 
biosimilar pathway would not be as immediately apparent as with the generic 
drug pathway under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Commission nonetheless 
recognized that the ten to thirty percent decrease in price still represented 
significant consumer savings.158 A statement from the Congressional Budget 
Office in 2010 reiterated this point by suggesting that a biosimilar pathway 
would lead to a $7 billion reduction in the federal deficit between 2010 and 
2019.159  
Unlike their cheaper biosimilar counterparts, most biologics are secured by 
patents, which contributes to higher costs for patients who may have few other 
 
DISCOVERY TODAY 379, 380 (Mar. 2016); see also Mannching Sherry Ku, Recent Trends in Specialty 
Pharma Business Model, 23 J. FOOD & DRUG ANALYSIS 595, 598 (2015). 
 153. Aron Fischer, Supreme Court Decides Amgen v. Sandoz: Patent Dance Cannot Be Enforced by 
Federal Injunction, Notice of Commercial Marketing Can Be Given at Any Time, BIOLOGICSBLOG (June 
14, 2017), https://www.biologicsblog.com/supreme-court-decides-amgen-v-sandoz-patent-dance-cannot-
be-enforced-by-federal-injunction-notice-of-commercial-marketing-can-be-given-at-any-time 
(emphasizing that the Sandoz’s interpretation of the notice timeline in the BPCIA will allow biosimilar 
entry into the drug market sooner). 
 154. Id. 
 155. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.  
 156. Christine Blank, Supreme Court Ruling Raises Biosimilars’ Access, MODERNMEDICINE 
NETWORK (June 19, 2017), http://www.drugtopics.com/latest/supreme-court-ruling-raises-biosimilars-
access.  
 157. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG 
COMPETITION 47 (2009) (outlining an analysis of the effects of the creation of an abbreviated pathway for 
the development of biosimilars). 
 158. Id. at v.  
 159. Grabowski, supra note 147, at 544–545. 
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options.160 Against this backdrop, it is crucial to encourage biosimilar 
manufacturers to enter these drug markets as soon as the patents for biologics 
products expire. As more biosimilars entering the market, competition will 
increase among manufacturers of biologics and biosimilars, resulting in lower 
prices for consumers because of the desire of pharmaceutical companies to 
ensure that their products stay competitive.161 Added biosimilar presence in the 
drug market can increase the availability of marketing assessment and 
implementation strategies that are primarily used by biologics manufacturers.162 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sandoz further promotes market 
accessibility for biosimilars by creating a mechanism for biosimilar 
manufacturers to begin implementing commercial marketing strategies, such as 
outreach to doctors and other forms of targeted advertising,163 as soon as the 
company obtains FDA approval.164 Faster marketing for biosimilars results in 
patients, physicians, and pharmacists, being made aware of the existence of 
quality-of-life improving therapies sooner.165 This is significant in light of the 
research demonstrating that drug marketing strategies, particularly direct-to-
consumer marketing campaigns, result in significant information dissemination 
of new products.166 This facilitates having a shorter period between FDA 
approval and commercial marketing, which is significant considering the 
existing barriers to cheaper drug alternatives, like high copays.167 Consequently, 
 
 160. See THE AM. CONSUMER INST. CTR. FOR CITIZEN RESEARCH, LIFE SAVING DRUGS AT LOWER 
COSTS, https://www.theamericanconsumer.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Biosimilars-
ConsumerGram-Final.pdf (describing that prices per year per patient for certain conditions like blood 
diseases, Crohn’s and Hunter’s syndrome can cost $400,000; $50,000; and $375,00 respectively).  
 161. Id. at 2. 
 162. Carlsen, supra note 146, at 3. 
 163. Mary Ebeling, ‘Get with the Program!’: Pharmaceutical marketing, symptom checklists and self-
diagnosis, 73 SOC. SCI. & MED. 825, 826 (2011) (identifying other forms of marketing strategies for 
pharmaceuticals, such as targeting other health care professionals, promotional educational events, and 
direct-to-consumer advertising). 
 164. Christine Blank, Supreme Court Ruling Raises Biosimilars’ Access, MODERNMEDICINE 
NETWORK (June 19, 2017), http://www.drugtopics.com/latest/supreme-court-ruling-raises-biosimilars-
access. 
 165. An analysis of marketing strategies among pharmaceutical companies by McKinsey & Company 
suggests that companies can mitigate losses following drug launches by capturing the momentum 
associated with early consumer exposure to the product. Hemant Ahlawat, et. al., The Secret of Successful 
Drug Launches, MCKINSEY & CO. (Mar. 2014) https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-
and-medical-products/our-insights/the-secret-of-successful-drug-launches.  
 166. Ebeling, supra note 163, at 826 (citing a 2008 survey conducted to gage direct-to-consumer 
advertising in which 91 percent of people who completed the survey indicated that they “had seen or heard 
at least one drug advertisement”). 
 167. HUTCHINS POLICY BRIEF, TEN CHALLENGES IN THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKET – AND TEN 
SOLUTIONS 1, 4 (2017). Insurers create these high co-pays to encourage patients to find cheaper 
alternatives but, when drug companies engage in the practice of distributing coupons to consumers to 
cover high co-pay prices, this has the effect of decreasing the likelihood of patients exploring low-cost 
alternatives. Id.  
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biosimilar manufacturers can begin benefitting from a lucrative drug market,168 
which will contribute to the positive patient outcomes of cheaper prices and 
increased accessibility to alternative treatments.  
B.. Allowing Pre-Approval Notice of Commercial Marketing Levels the Playing 
Field Between Biologic and Biosimilar Manufacturers  
The second prong of the holding in Sandoz underscores the leveling of the 
playing field between biologics and biosimilars manufacturers in an arena where 
the former typically has the upper hand. For example, the steps of the “patent 
dance” are advantageous to biologics manufacturers because of the exclusivity 
period that follows the licensure for a biologic.169 The BPCIA’s amendments to 
subsection (k) of the PHSA create two types of exclusivity for the reference 
product sponsor.170 First, an applicant is not allowed to file its aBLA with the 
FDA for review until four years after the date that the reference product was first 
licensed.171 Second, under § 351(k)(7)(C) of the PHSA, the FDA cannot approve 
a biosimilar product sooner than twelve years after licensure of the original 
biologic product.172 Thus, the statute creates a security mechanism for biologics 
manufacturers by delaying both the applicant’s filing and as well as the 
applicant’s hope for approval of its own product for another eight years after 
submitting its aBLA. 
Biologics manufacturers receive added protection because subsection (k) 
requires applicants to wait 180 days after licensure before sending notice of 
commercial marketing.173 The twelve-year exclusivity period incentivizes 
biologics manufacturers because they stand to benefit from even more market 
security than that guaranteed by the patents originally associated with their 
products.174 Therefore, strict adherence to a 180-day period before premarketing 
notice limits market opportunities for biosimilar manufacturers. Requiring 
biosimilar manufacturers to wait another six months to give notice of commercial 
marketing extends the exclusivity period to twelve years and six months. Apotex 
 
 168. Ester Bloom, Here’s how much the average American spends on health care, CNBC (June 23 
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unsuccessfully raised this argument against Amgen in 2015.175 The Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit interpreted the relevant provision to imply that 
FDA approval can occur at the earliest date of twelve years following the 
licensure of the reference product.176 Therefore it was not unfair to allow only 
post-licensure notice under § 262(l)(8)(A). In its discussion, the court of appeals 
expressed that there was nothing preventing the FDA from issuing a license to a 
biosimilar product after eleven and a half years with the caveat that it will not be 
official until the twelve-year mark.177  
However, this argument ignores that a biosimilar applicant with a 
provisional license after 11.5 years has to wait another full year from that point 
just to give notice to the reference product sponsor about future commercial 
marketing. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s analysis in Amgen Inc. 
v. Apotex Inc. appears to minimize this burden to biosimilar manufacturers 
simply because they still benefit from eventual FDA approval. The reality is that 
a further delay of six months following approval risks imposing a financial 
burden on a biosimilar manufacturer who has already spent millions178 
developing a product and an effective marketing strategy, only to be required to 
wait six another months before it can benefit from its innovation and enter the 
market. The Supreme Court’s holding in Sandoz erodes this impediment to 
market access by sticking close to the language of § 262(l)(8)(A)179 and 
providing only the period of exclusivity proscribed for reference product 
sponsors and nothing more. This spells good news for biosimilar applicants, who 
now have a way to fight against industry preference of post-licensure notice of 
commercial marketing. 
Companies, like Amgen, that prefer reading the statute to require applicants 
to wait the 180 days insist that period is necessary to give the reference product 
sponsor “a period of time to assess and act upon its patent.”180 This argument 
loses persuasiveness in light of the premarket litigation scheme already outlined 
in the BPCIA, which protects the patent rights of the biologic manufacturer. For 
example, under § 262(l)(3)(A) of the BPCIA, the reference product sponsor can 
develop a list of patents associated with the reference product and then if the 
biosimilar applicant chooses to engage in negotiations, both parties can decide 
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which patents will result in litigation.181 If the biosimilar applicant elects not to 
participate in these negotiations, the BPCIA makes available preliminary 
injunction and declaratory judgment actions to enforce the patents held by the 
reference product sponsor. 182 These forms of relief empower the reference 
product sponsor to delay the FDA’s approval of a biosimilar, which is a 
significant statutory grant of authority.  
The effect of the BPCIA in granting biologics manufacturers the ability to 
potentially stall biosimilar approval is a powerful deterrent to biosimilar 
applicants, especially when compounded with the fact that big biologics 
manufacturers have already adopted one strategy of delaying the market entry of 
biosimilars. This strategy involves the reference product sponsor giving money, 
or other consideration, to the biosimilar applicant in exchange for the applicant 
not entering the market immediately.183 These arrangements are known pay-for-
delay184 agreements and they ultimately benefit the biologic manufacturer 
because a biologic manufacturer that can secure the market delay of a biosimilar 
can control higher prices of its product.185 Even the FTC has acknowledged the 
inherent danger of these agreements in hindering consumer access to critical and 
low-cost generic alternatives.186 As a result, consumers are dramatically limited 
in their drug options because the only available products are often biologics, 
which are more expensive187 than “traditional drugs of the pharmaceutical 
industry.”188  
The Supreme Court’s acceptance of the pre-approval notice under § 
262(l)(8)(A) of the BPCIA189 limits a biologic manufacturer’s ability to delay a 
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biosimilar applicant’s market entry. Biologics manufacturers could still try to 
enter pay-for-delay agreements, but now that biosimilar applicants can provide 
pre-approval notice of commercial marketing without risking a statutory 
violation, these arrangements will be less enticing to biosimilar applicants 
because they can now market and launch products sooner.190 In fact, the end 
result of the Supreme Court’s holding may be in deterring biologics 
manufacturers from encouraging pay-for-delay agreements once those 
companies realize that biosimilars now have greater incentive to push for earlier 
market entry, which is good news for consumers.  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s holding is a substantial win for biosimilar 
manufacturers because these companies now have an opportunity to challenge 
the tight market exclusivity that biologics manufacturers hold.191 Biosimilar 
manufacturers now have a more streamlined route to the drug market because 
they can provide pre-approval notice of first commercial marketing to reference 
product sponsors without violating the BPCIA. The positive effect of this 
decision is that it improves access to cost effective therapies so patients no longer 
have to rely only on biologic drugs for a wide variety of common medical 
conditions.192  
V. CONCLUSION 
In Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., the Supreme Court’s plain language 
interpretation and focus on the structure of the BPCIA resulted in the correct 
holding that biosimilar applicants can provide the reference product sponsor with 
notice of commercial marketing prior to FDA approval. This part of the Court’s 
holding reflects the ultimate goals of the BPCIA to promote innovation and drug 
accessibility for patients while also recognizing that biosimilar products already 
face inherent challenges to gaining market access. Therefore, the BPCIA should 
not be interpreted to impose additional barriers to biosimilar manufacturers 
whose products act as a cheaper alternative to patients.  
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